Wire-Tap Chanel |
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Title |
Abstract |
Wiretap channel of
type I (noisy version of channel outputs) |
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Consider the wiretap channel with discrete, memoryless channel (DMC) and find the trade-off curve between the transmission rate R and equivocation d, assuming perfect transmission. |
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It is shown that it is possible to send at capacity on the main link and still keep the wiretapper's information equal to zero on many, large, arbitrary portions of the message. |
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Wyner's results for discrete memoryless wire-tap channels are extended to the Gaussian wire-tap channel. |
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The special class of wiretap channels for which a certain quantity Gamma(R) is constant is examined. It is shown that for "symmetric" wiretap channels, Gamma(R) is equal to the difference between the capacities of the main channel and the channel from the sender to the wiretapper. |
Secure multiplex coding to attain the channel capacity in wiretap channels |
A multiplex coding scheme with plural independent messages is proposed to remove the loss (C-Cs). |
On an Upper Bound of the Secrecy Capacity for a General Wiretap Channel |
The authors give a new upper bound of Cs not including auxiliary random variables and explore conditions under which the obtained upper bound becomes tight for the cascaded wiretap channel. |
An Achievable Region for the Gaussian Wiretap Channel With Side Information |
The authors extend the Gaussian wiretap channel model to the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information by introducing additive white Gaussian interference in the main channel, which is available to the encoder in advance. A perfect-secrecy-achieving coding strategy for the model is proposed. |
On Achieving Capacity on the Wire Tap channel using LDPC Codes |
The authors investigate the use of capacity and near-capacity achieving LPDC codes on the wire tap channel. |
On the application of LDPC codes to a novel wiretap channel inspired by quantum key distribution |
The authors provide a novel proof for the secrecy capacity theorem for wire tap channels and show how capacity achieving codes can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. |
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The authors consider the rate-one convolutional encoder in the wiretap channel. |
On secret sharing communication systems with two or three channels |
Source coding problem is considered for secret sharing communication systems (SSCs's) with two or three channels. |
Coding theorem for secret sharing communication systems with two noisy channels |
The coding theorem is proved for the secret sharing communication system (SSCS) with two noisy channels, each of which is a broadcast channel. |
A Coding Theorem for Secret Sharing Communication Systems with Two Gaussian Wiretap Channels |
The coding theorem is proved for the secret sharing communication system (SSCS) with two Gaussian wiretap channels. |
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The authors consider the Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap Channel and derive the outer bounds for the secure rate region. |
Generalized Multiple Access Channels with Confidential Messages |
A discrete memoryless generalized multiple access channel (GMAC) with confidential messages is studied. |
The Discrete Memoryless Multiple Access Channel with Confidential Messages |
A multiple-access channel is considered in which messages from one encoder are confidential. Confidential messages are to be transmitted with perfect secrecy, as measured by equivocation at the other encoder. The upper bounds and the achievable rates for this communication situation are determined. |
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The authors present a single letter characterization of the secrecy capacity of the single-input multiple-outputs (SIMO) channel under Gaussian (and possibly colored) noise. |
Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information |
The problem of generating a shared secret key S by two parties knowing dependent random variables X and Y, respectively, but not sharing a secret key initially, is considered. An enemy who knows the random variable Z, can also receive all messages exchanged by the two parties over a public channel. The goal of a protocol is that the enemy obtains at most a negligible amount of information about S. |
Unconditionally secure key agreement and the intrinsic conditional information |
The authors define a new conditional mutual information measure, the intrinsic conditional mutual information between X and Y when given Z, which is an upper bound on I(X; Y|Z). |
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This is the first part of a three-part paper on secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries. The authors consider the important special case where the legitimate partners as well as the adversary have access to the outcomes of many independent repetitions of a fixed tripartite random experiment. In this case, the result characterizing the possibility of secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries is of all-or-nothing nature: either a secret key can be generated at the same rate as in the (well-studied) passive-adversary case, or such secret-key agreement is completely impossible. |
Secret-Key Agreement Over Unauthenticated Public Channels - Part II: The Simulatability Condition |
This is the second part of a three-part paper on secret- key agreement secure against active adversaries. The authors introduce a new formalism, based on a mechanical model for representing the involved quantities, that allows for dealing with discrete joint distributions of random variables and their manipulations by noisy channels. The authors show that this representation leads to a simple and efficient characterization of the possibility of secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries. |
Secret-Key Agreement Over Unauthenticated Public Channels - Part III: Privacy Amplification |
This is the third part of a three-part paper on secret- key agreement secure against active adversaries. The authors consider the special case where the legitimate partners already share a mutual string which might, however, be partially known to the adversary. We consider the same problem with respect to an active adversary and propose two protocols, one based on universal hashing and one based on extractors, allowing for privacy amplification secure against an adversary whose knowledge about the initial partially secret string is limited to one third of the length of this string. |
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Several nonasymptotic formulas are established in channel resolvability and identification capacity, and they are applied to the wiretap channel. |
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Wiretap channel of type II (partial knowledge of channel outputs) |
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The encoder is to be designed to maximize the intruder's uncertainty about the data given his N intercepted channel bits, subject to the condition that the intended receiver can recover the K data bits perfectly from the N channel bits. The optimal tradeoff between the parameters K, N, u(number of channel bits observed by the intruder) and the intruder's uncertainty H (conditional entropy of the data given the u intercepted channel bits) was found. |
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The user is split into multiple parties who are coordinated in coding their data symbols by using the same encoder. The adversary can tap not only partial transmitted symbols but also partial data symbols. The authors are interested in the equivocation of the data symbols to this adversary who has more power than that of Ozarow and Wyner. |